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Abstract This article presents evidence for a rising emancipatory spirit, across genera-
tions and around the world, in a life domain in which religion hitherto blocked emanci-
patory gains: sexual freedoms. We propose an explanation of rising emancipative values
that integrates several approaches into a single idea—the utility ladder of freedoms.
Specifically, we suggest that objectively improving living conditions—from rising life
expectancies to broader education—transform the nature of life from a source of threats
into a source of opportunities. As life begins to hold more promise for increasing popu-
lation segments, societies climb the utility ladder of freedoms: practicing and respecting
universal freedoms becomes increasingly vital to take advantage of rising life opportuni-
ties. This trend has begun to spill over into a life domain in which religious norms have
until recently been able to resist emancipatory gains: sexual freedoms. We present (1)
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crossnational, (2) longitudinal, (3) generational and (4) multilevel evidence on an
unprecedentedly broad basis in support of this theory.
Keywords Cultural change  Economic development  Emancipation  Emancipative
values  Existential opportunities  Fertility norms  Freedom ladder  Life quality  Moral
evolution  Religion  Secular values  Sexual liberation
1 Introduction
With the liberal revolutions of the Enlightenment era, human history has taken a sharp turn
(Grayling 2007; Goldstone 2009). Ever since, struggles for emancipatory gains—from the
abolition of slavery to the enforcement of human rights—have become a defining feature
of modernity, and increasingly so (Markoff 1996; Tilly and Wood 2009; Pinker 2011). Of
course, this does not mean that modernity is an uninterrupted chain of emancipatory
triumphs. On the contrary, emancipatory struggles regularly meet the resistance of reac-
tionary forces, including right-wing extremism, armed terrorism and religious fundamen-
talism (Armstrong 2001; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2004). Nevertheless, social movements,
civil society actors and advocacy groups around the world continue to campaign for
emancipatory gains, and they have been pushing the frontline of these gains to ever new
fields (Clark 2009; Carter 2012).
More recently, the frontline has reached a domain in which religion and other con-
servative forces have been most successful in blocking emancipatory gains: sexual free-
doms (Kafka 2005; Knudsen 2006; Frank et al. 2010).1 Indeed, legalization of abortion and
same-sex marriage, together with laws against the discrimination of homosexuals, mark
emancipatory breakthroughs at the societies’ reproductive grassroots: households, families
and the sexual norms that shape their fabric (Sunder 2003; Alexander and Welzel 2011a;
Asal et al. 2013). Here, emancipatory gains touch on a most fundamental domain of
freedoms: the possession of our bodies and self-determination over our sexuality.
As this article will show, sexual freedoms represent the youngest domain in which we
observe a rising emancipatory spirit. Societies marching towards sexual emancipation have
made emancipatory gains in other areas, such as women’s suffrage, already earlier
(Knudsen 2006; Paxton and Hughes 2007). And despite counter-motions by religious
forces in Nigeria, Turkey, Russia and elsewhere, emancipative values are rising at an
exceptionally steep slope in the domain of sexual freedoms.
Emancipatory gains in sexual freedoms are linked with the ‘‘second demographic
transition’’—a trend towards longer education, later marriage, alternative forms of
cohabitation and lower fertility (Lesthaeghe 2010). This article examines the motivational
force driving this trend: rising mass support for sexual self-determination (Twenge et al.
2015b).
Support for sexual freedoms belongs to a broader set of emancipative values, which
emphasize freedom of choice and equality of opportunities. However, among the various
components of these values, support for sexual freedoms has emerged more recently and
most rapidly. At the same time, sexual freedoms remain an especially contested domain of
1 To the recentness of this development, see the Response Section in our Online Appendix (OA 23: 42) at
this journal’s website (http://www.springer.com/social?sciences/journal/11205).
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emancipation because conservative forces, most notably religion, concentrate their resis-
tance here (Frank et al. 2010; Hildebrandt 2014; Doebler 2015).
In Freedom Rising, Welzel formulates an ‘‘evolutionary theory of emancipation’’ to
explain emerging emancipative values (Welzel 2013, 2014). But the author does not apply
this theory to sexual freedoms in particular. Given this domain’s exceptional dynamic and
contestation, this is a critical omission. Our examination fills this gap, testing the theory of
emancipation specifically with respect to sexual freedoms.
The theory of emancipation takes as a starting point the rising life expectancies in many
parts of the world (Welzel 2013: 4). As people’s lifetime horizons extend, education and
other investments in human development with a long delay of gratification gain appeal—an
appeal that is absent when families are pre-occupied with reproduction to secure the
continuation of their lineage in the face of short life expectancies (Woodley 2012). But
where time horizons expand, the nature of life changes from a source of constraints into a
source of opportunities. As this happens, societies climb the utility ladder of freedoms:
universal freedoms become increasingly vital for using the opportunities offered by a more
prospective—and for that matter—promising life.
The theory of emancipation posits that evolution has endowed humans with the ability
to recognize life opportunities because this ability is essential for success. Thus, an
objective ascension of opportunities does not escape people’s awareness and, hence,
induces an adaptive shift in subjective values—giving rise to emancipatory orientations
that support universal freedoms. This utility-value link is key to human functioning
because it keeps our lives in touch with reality.
Sexual freedoms are of particular significance in this context. Throughout history,
sexual reproduction has been the life domain in which tradition proved most powerful in
blocking emancipatory gains. Propped up by religion, traditional norms in practically every
culture emphasize kinship ties, family size and high fertility under male control of female
sexuality (Smuts 1995; Norris and Inglehart 2003; Blumberg 2004; Lesthaeghe 2010;
Alexander and Welzel 2011b). Against the perennial inertia of these traditional family,
fertility and sex norms, rising emancipative values in the domain of sexual freedoms signal
an evolutionary breakthrough in the development of moral systems. As we will demon-
strate, this moral evolution is induced by expanding opportunity endowments in the lives of
increasing population segments.
For the first time, this article presents evidence for these propositions on a global cross-
cultural basis.2 In so doing, our examination breaks new ground in three ways. First, we
examine the impact of an unprecedentedly wide range of opportunity-endowing societal
conditions. Second, we pay special attention to dynamic patterns and temporal order in the
co-evolution of emancipative values and opportunity endowments. Third, we examine
emancipative values with a distinct focus on sexual freedoms, and we do so on the widest
cross-national and longitudinal basis ever used in the study of values, covering a period of
almost 30 years among societies representing more than ninety percent of the world
population.
For reasons of brevity, the term ‘‘emancipative values’’ refers specifically to the domain
of sexual freedoms, here and throughout the remainder of this article—which is organized
2 An exception is the US for which the richest longitudinal evidence in population attitudes exists. In line
with our claims, Twenge et al. (2015b) demonstrate a pronounced generational increase in sexual tolerance
among US residents. This trend is paralleled by a similarly pronounced decline in religiosity (Twenge et al.
2015a). Our article shows that these intertwined trends apply to much wider parts of the world than just the
US.
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in four sections. Section one presents a framework to integrate disparate explanations of
emancipative values and anticipates the key findings derived from this framework. Sec-
tion two describes the data and methods used to demonstrate these findings. Section three
illustrates them. The final section discusses the implications and limitations of the
evidence.
2 Theory: The Utility Ladder of Freedoms
The idea of a utility ladder of freedoms constitutes the pivotal principle of Welzel’s
evolutionary theory of emancipation (Welzel 2013: 37–56, 2014: 48). The idea involves
two premises:
1. Variability in Freedoms’ Utility. Guarantees of universal freedoms have varying utility
for people in how to master their lives: the utility of such guarantees grows when
people’s existential conditions embody more options for intentional action. Then,
more guarantees are needed to protect people’s choices on how to use their options.
With few options for intentional action, legal guarantees of choices are rather useless.
2. The Utility-Value-Link. Human life strategies are shaped by a utility-value link: people
tend to value what is useful for mastering life under given circumstances. This utility-
value link keeps human existence in touch with reality. Hence, if expanding life
opportunities enhance the utility of guaranteed freedoms in an objective sense,
subjective values adjust in the same direction, towards supporting freedoms.
Literatures from different disciplines support these premises. These literatures include:
(a) works on the ‘‘democratic character’’ (Lasswell 1951) and its opposite, the ‘‘authori-
tarian personality’’ (Adorno et al. 1950; Rokeach 1960; Duckit and Bizumic 2013);
(b) studies in experimental psychology on ‘‘preventive’’ versus ‘‘promotive’’ orientations
and on weak versus strong ‘‘social dominance orientations’’ (Higgins et al. 1998; Higgins
2005; Sidanius et al. 1994, 2000); (c) research in sociobiology on the cultural conse-
quences of disease stress (Thornhill et al. 2009; Murray et al. 2013); (d) investigations in
political sociology on liberal orientations (Stouffer 1955; Sullivan et al. 1982; Brint 1984;
Lamont 1987; Sullivan and Transue 1999) and its opposites—right-wing extremism and
religious fundamentalism (Jackson et al. 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Givens 2005;
Huddy et al. 2005; Wagner et al. 2006; Coenders et al. 2008); and (e) examinations in
political culture on ‘‘survival-vs.-self-expression values’’ (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).
The central idea on which these literatures converge can be related to a contrast known
in evolutionary psychology as ‘‘short’’ versus ‘‘long life histories’’ (Woodley 2012). ‘‘Short
life histories’’ are characterized by high mortality and fertility and correlate with poverty,
social immobility and lacking education. The constraints of these conditions leave people
little choice about how to dedicate their time; they are permanently forced to meet their
most pressing needs. Accordingly, people perceive life that way and see little value in
freedoms that they could not use anyways. By contrast, ‘‘long life histories’’ are manifest in
low mortality and fertility and associate with prosperity, social mobility and widespread
education. These conditions leave people considerable choice about how to devote their
time and shape their biographies. Consequently, people see life as a source of opportunities
and value the freedoms that allow them to take advantage of these opportunities.
By far the largest part of human history is characterized by the ‘‘short life history’’
condition. Only since the Industrial Revolution have some limited segments of humanity
began to overcome this dismal condition (Goldstone 2009). But since the last 40 years,
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most of the world population is a in transition towards ‘‘long life histories’’: falling
mortality and fertility, together with rising prosperity, education and social mobility
expand the life opportunities of most populations around the globe (Estes 2010; Welzel
2013: 4). As life opportunities ascend on a mass scale, entire populations climb the utility
ladder of freedoms and increasingly embrace emancipative values.
Three qualifications of this proposition are due. First, ascending life opportunities give
rise to emancipative values in the domain of sexual freedoms only insofar as these
opportunities promote secularization. The reason is religion’s intimate alliance with tra-
ditional reproduction norms. Decades of research confirm that religion—irrespective of the
specific denomination—protects traditional reproduction norms and, thus, sustains a shield
against emancipatory gains in this domain (Harkness 1972; Ruether 1974; Peek et al. 1991;
Norris and Inglehart 2003; Burn and Busso 2005; Doebler 2015). Traditional reproduction
norms are functional under the constraints of ‘‘short life histories’’: when mortality, pov-
erty and extreme inequality are prevalent, high female fertility under male control is
instrumental for the continuation of family lineages (Blumberg 2004; Hudson et al. 2012).
‘‘Short life histories’’ provide also the condition under which religion is appealing: the
promise of salvation from this-worldly misery makes it easier to accept dismal conditions
(Becker 1973; Solomon et al. 1991; Jong et al. 2013). Hence, existential constraints create
a natural alliance between religiosity and traditional sex norms (Inglehart and Norris 2011;
Doebler 2015). Since ascending life opportunities diminish existential constraints, these
opportunities erode the utility of traditional sex norms. Yet, emancipative values spread
into the domain of reproductive freedoms only if religiosity declines under the felt utility
loss of traditional sex norms. Secularization is, hence, an intermediate step from ascending
life opportunities to sexual emancipation.
Second, emancipative values represent a socially reciprocal orientation: their emphasis
on universal freedoms includes the freedoms of others, which is an attitude that one adopts
more easily if others reciprocate the favor and value one’s own freedoms in return. To
spread, these reciprocations need widely shared utilities, based on opportunity endowments
that are common in a society. This proposition suggests that people’s emancipative values
grow more on the basis of options they share with many others than on the basis of options
they have on top of what most others have. In that sense, the utility ladder of freedoms is
about socially shared utilities, not individually unique utilities.3
Third, ascending life opportunities are likely to give rise to emancipative values more
strongly among younger generations because age increases the inertia of people’s for-
mative values (Inglehart 1977; 2008). Hence, life opportunities measured over the time of a
given birth cohort’s upbringing predict fairly well the cohort members’ emancipative
values today.
These propositions inform five key findings that the evidence section will demonstrate:
1. Societies with greater life opportunities among the bulk of the population today exhibit
higher mean levels of emancipative values.
2. Societies in which the life opportunities of the population improved more experienced
greater gains in emancipative values.
3 The utility ladder of freedoms coincides with the hierarchy of motivations: higher rungs on the utility
ladder correspond with higher-ordered motivations (Maslow 1954). Specifically, the more evolved drive for
self-development and learning lends itself more closely to freedoms than the more basic drive for defense
and survival (Lawrence and Nohria 2002). Yet, the emphasis of the utility ladder on shared utilities gives the
utility ladder a social dimension that the hierarchy of motivations lacks. For this reason, the utility ladder is
a more adequate tool to describe social change than the hierarchy of motivations.
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3. Birth cohorts in societies whose existential conditions embodied greater life
opportunities back in time exhibit stronger emancipative values today.
4. People’s emancipative values are strengthened more powerfully by life opportunities
that are socially common than by opportunities that are individually unique.
5. On all these accounts, the advancement of emancipative values is conditional on
corresponding advancements in secular values.4
3 Data
3.1 Sources and Sample
We measure emancipative values using the World Values Surveys (WVS 2010). At the
time of this writing, the WVS completed five waves of representative national surveys
from 1981 to 2008, with random samples of adult populations in countries around the globe
(for documentation see: www.worldvaluessurvey.org). We report measurement details,
data sources, descriptive statistics and provide links to replication data in an Online
Appendix (OA), accessible at this journal’s website (http://www.springer.com/
social?sciences/journal/11205). The OA also includes a response section where we clar-
ify issues that came up in the review process. Data from the sixth wave of the WVS,
conducted from 2011 till 2014, became available only after our analyses have been
finalized. We have, however, tested if the trend towards rising emancipative values con-
tinues into wave six and the evidence is strongly confirmatory.
In support of our propositions, we present four distinct types of findings, including (1)
cross-sectional, (2) longitudinal, (3) cohort-related and (4) multilevel evidence. From the
cross-sectional perspective, we explain between-societal differences in emancipative val-
ues. For this analytical step, we use data from eighty-one to ninety-three societies
worldwide. As the list of countries and their attribution to global cultural zones in
Appendix-Table 1 (OA 1: 6) shows, these societies distribute quite evenly across all
regions of the globe.
From a longitudinal point of view, we explain the direction and amount of change in
emancipative values among those societies for which a considerable time series exists. This
diminishes the sample to about fifty societies. But even this smaller sample includes the
societies with the largest populations in each world region, as documented in OA 19 (p.
30). The smaller longitudinal sample shows similar variability in the key variables of
interest as the larger cross-sectional sample. This is documented in Appendix-Table 9 (OA
19: 30).
From a generational perspective, we explain cohort differences in emancipative values
within and between societies. Specifically, we demonstrate that the mean level of eman-
cipative values in a given birth cohort is predicted by the respective country’s life
opportunities at the time when the members of this cohort were growing up. The variables
of interest are available for eighty-five societies of the cross-sectional sample, each being
divided into six successive birth cohorts, as documented in OA 15 (p. 26). The unit of
analysis is (85 9 6=) 510 country-cohorts.
4 For a discussion of inter- and intra-societal differences in human values, see the Response Section in our
Online Appendix (OA 23: 39, 41) at this journal’s website (http://www.springer.com/social?sciences/
journal/11205).
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From a multilevel perspective, we show how the emancipative values of some 130,000
respondents are shaped simultaneously by individual and societal characteristics. Data on
the variables of interest are available for eighty-nine societies of the cross-sectional
sample. Its composition is documented in Fig. 7.
3.2 Variables
All variables measuring attitudes are taken from the WVS. Variables measuring structural
characteristics of societies are taken from the Quality of Government Dataset (Quality of
Government Institute 2010). Without exception, we standardize every variable into a range
from minimum 0 to maximum 1, with fractions for intermediate positions. This makes
regression coefficients comparable across variables originally measured in different coding
schemes.
Our dependent variable, emancipative values in sexual freedoms, is a thirty-point index
measuring a respondent’s acceptance of homosexuality, abortion and divorce, as docu-
mented in OA 1 (pp. 4–6). These are the only items that capture sexual freedoms
throughout all consecutive rounds of the WVS. For a longitudinal analysis this is crucial.
The Cronbach’s alpha for the three items is .80 at the individual level and .85 at the
society level. The three items represent a single dimension within and across global cul-
tural zones (Appendix-Table 1, OA 1: 6). Using from each society (N = 93) the most
recent survey, the mean score in emancipative values is .31. The standard deviation is .28.
To measure the prevalence of emancipative values throughout each society, we cal-
culate the population average. As the left-hand diagram in Fig. 1 shows, the lowest scores
in emancipative values are found in Bangladesh (.03), Zimbabwe (.05), Jordan (.06) and
Nigeria (.09). The highest scores exist in Denmark (.67), Norway (.69), Andorra (.78) and
Sweden (.80).
Emancipative values in sexual freedoms indicate an emancipatory worldview in a
broader sense. This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that support for sexual freedoms
represents one of four components in Welzel’s (2013) broader measure of emancipative
values. The other components include an emphasis on (a) people’s voice, (b) personal
autonomy and (c) gender equality and are each measured by three items, as shown in OA 2
(pp. 7–9). At the individual level, emancipative values in sexual freedoms correlate with
emancipative values in these other fields significantly and positively at r = .23 (voice), .25
(autonomy) and .33 (equity). The society level correlations are .59, .60 and .73, in the
respective order. Nevertheless, support for sexual freedoms sticks out from emancipative
values in other domains: it represents an internally more coherent orientation and asso-
ciates more closely with theoretically expected correlates of an emancipatory worldview.5
There is also evidence that support for sexual freedoms represents the frontline where
emancipatory gains are both most recent and most contested. This can be seen from the fact
that average support for sexual freedoms (.31) is lower than support for people’s voice
5 Using the pooled individual-level data, including the latest available survey from each of our ninety-three
societies (N = 160,000 respondents), the Cronbach’s alpha for the three items of emancipative values in the
field of reproductive freedoms is .80, which compares to .64 for the three items of gender equity, .35 for the
three items of personal autonomy and .40 for the three items of people’s voice. What is more, emancipative
values in the field of reproductive freedoms correlate at r = .31 with participation in nonviolent social
movement activity, .23 with the perception of one’s daily tasks as intellectual and .38 with an enlightened
understanding of democracy. The associations with these expected correlates of emancipative values are .22,
.19 and .37 for an emphasis on gender equity; .21, .18 and .19 for an emphasis on personal autonomy; and
.24, .15 and .22 for an emphasis on people’s voice.
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(.36), personal autonomy (.44) and gender equality (.56). And support for sexual freedoms
is least consensual: the variance coefficient is .90, compared to .75 for support for people’s
voice, .70 for personal autonomy and .50 for gender equality.
These patterns qualify support for sexual freedoms as an orientation that is meaningfully
related to other indications of an emancipatory worldview but at the same time distinct
enough to justify a focus on precisely this field of emancipative values.
The right-hand diagram in Fig. 1 documents changes in emancipative values in the field of
sexual freedoms, from the earliest to the latest survey for the fifty societies of our longitudinal
sample.6 The average time distance covered is 17 years (for most societies, the earliest time
point is around 1990 and the latest around 2005). The average change score over all fifty
societies is?.10. Societies with positive changes above .05 scale points outnumber those with
negative changes of that scope by 37 to 5. If we focus on the eleven postindustrial societies
(footnoted in Fig. 5) that participated in both the first round of the WVS (1981) and the last
one (2008), the mean change score over these 27 years is?.20. Across the same societies and
time span, similar changes exist for the other components of emancipative values, albeit on a
narrower scope: ?.10 for gender equality, ?.12 for people’s voice and ?.18 for personal
autonomy (Welzel 2013: Online Appendix, pp. 47–48).7
To explain emancipative values we champion opportunity endowments of an existential
nature. Such endowments enhance people’s options for self-development. Following the ‘‘life
history approach,’’ we assume that populations benefit from richer opportunities for self-
development when (a) life expectancies are longer, (b) fertilities are lower, (c) access to
education is broader, (d) per capita incomes are more equally distributed and (e) higher on
average. To measure these life opportunities, we use a population’s (a) average life expectancy
at birth, (b) its inverse fertility rate, (c) tertiary enrollment ratio and mean years of schooling,
(d) the inverse of the Gini coefficient for income inequality, and (e) the per capita Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) in purchasing power parities, all taken from the time at which
emancipative values are measured (OA 6: 15–16). These indicators are equivalent to those
combined by Woodley (2012) to measure the opportunity endowments of ‘‘long life histories.’’
All life opportunity measures converge in a single dimension and the Cronbach’s alpha
of the six indicators is .85. Thus, we summarize these measures into an encompassing
index of life opportunities as detailed in OA 6. To straighten out a curved distribution, we
square the original index.8
Apart from life opportunities, another source of permissive conditions comprises a
society’s institutional qualities—qualities that make people’s lives safer and their options
more certain and predictable.9 We label these qualities ‘‘bureaucratic integrity,’’ ‘‘law and
6 Since we are concerned with change in variables that move at glacial pace, it is important to measure
change over the largest available time interval. Short-term changes, by contrast, easily capture random
fluctuations that are irrelevant in a developmental context. Throughout this article, change in a given
variable is calculated by subtracting the earliest score from its latest score. Since all variables are stan-
dardized into a range from 0 to 1, changes range from a theoretical minimum of -1 to a theoretical maximum
of ?1, with 0 indicating no change. Against skepticism in the early literature (e.g., Cronbach and Furby
1970), recent scholarship defends the analyses of change scores as essential to the understanding of dynamic
relations (Liker et al. 1985; Allison 1990; Miller and Kane 2001). For an exemplary analysis of change
scores in the field of women’s empowerment, see Alexander (2012).
7 These cultural changes are paralleled by a significant decrease in people’s willingness to fight for their
country in the case of war (Inglehart et al. 2015).
8 For a further discussion of this index, see the Response Section in OA 23 (p. 37).
9 We keep indicators of permissive conditions separate across the existential, institutional and cultural
domains in order to uncover these domains’ distinct impacts.
Emancipating Sexuality: Breakthroughs into a Bulwark of… 917
123
order,’’ ‘‘civil supremacy’’ and ‘‘administrative accountability.’’ Data on these variables
originate in the International Country Risk Guide and summarize expert judgments on
safety from the risks of corruption (bureaucratic integrity), disorder (law and order),
military takeovers (civil supremacy) and state chicanery (administrative accountability).
The Risk Guide’s summary indicator of safety from all these risks (originally named
‘‘political risk’’), is labeled institutional functioning index here (see OA 9: 19).10
Apart from institutional functioning, democracy is another source of permissive con-
ditions because it entitles people to voice their policy preferences and make them count.
When it comes to lasting entitlements, enduring democracy is important. To measure
enduring democracy we use Gerring et al.’s (2005) ‘‘democracy stock index’’ (OA 10:
20–21). In addition, we use Welzel’s (2013: 253–260) civic entitlements index (OA 5: 14).
Besides formal institutions, cultural norms are a source of more restrictive or permissive
conditions. Gelfand et al. (2011) describe cultures as ‘‘tight’’ when their norms are rigid
and as ‘‘loose’’ when these norms are permissive. Likewise, Suh et al. (1998) attribute
restrictive tendencies to ‘‘collectivist’’ norms and permissive tendencies to ‘‘individualis-
tic’’ norms. We use these authors’ measures of tightness-vs.-looseness and collectivism-
vs.-individualism as documented in OA 10 (pp. 20–21). Another manifestation of cultural
restrictions is traditional reproduction norms, which are evident in ‘‘consanguine’’ mar-
riage patterns and ‘‘patrilocal’’ household structures (Blumberg 2004; Hudson et al. 2012).
Consanguine marriages happen among distant relatives; patrilocal households are formed
when couples live with the husband’s parents. To measure consanguinity, we use the data
from Woodley and Bell (2012). To measure patrilocality we calculate from the latest WVS
for each society the fraction of married men above the age of thirty living in their parents’
household (see OA 10: 20–21).
An inverse indicator of traditional family, fertility and sex norms and, thus, a measure of
permissive cultural environments is the prevalence of secular values. To measure secular
values we use questions from the WVS covering three aspects of religiosity: the impor-
tance attributed to religion, self-description as a religious person and frequency of service
attendance. As documented in OA 3 (pp. 10–12), all three measures are highly correlated,
so we average them and then inverse the average to obtain a measure of secular values—
indicating a distance to religiosity. To measure the prevalence of secular values, we
calculate the national mean. This is an important, yet more concise, component of Welzel’s
(2013: 63–66) broader measure of secular values.
At the society level, measures of values no longer indicate personal preferences.
Instead, they turn into measures of a society’s cultural tendency, indicating to what extent
personal values represent shared collective norms (Welzel 2013: 84).11
Yet another domain of permissive conditions is the absence of violence and armed
conflict. We use three indicators. Internal peace is the inverse of Gibney et al.’s (2010)
‘‘political terror scale,’’ measuring the absence of state repression. External peace is the
inverse of a society’s international conflict involvement, taken from Gleditsch et al. (2002).
10 Alternatively, we used the ‘‘good governance’’ indicators from the World Bank (Kaufman et al. 2010).
But these indicators show no closer association with emancipative values than do the indicators of the Risk
Guide.
11 We experimented with different prevalence measures, using the median instead of the mean or the
geometric and quadratic means instead of the arithmetic means as well as proportions of respondents scoring
in the upper quartiles and quintiles of our multi-point value measures. None of these variants produced
stronger results than those obtained by the arithmetic population means. For a discussion of the appropri-
ateness of aggregating individual-level values to the society level, see the Response Section in OA 23 (pp.
39–41).
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Encompassing peace is based on the ‘‘global peace index’’ by the Vision of Humanity
(2010), as documented in OA 10 (pp. 20–21).
To some extent, every society is influenced by its international environment but this
influence is arguably stronger for societies that are more involved in international
exchange. For instance, global discourses that advocate emancipative values have a
stronger impact on societies that are more exposed to such discourses through higher rates
of international exchange. Thus, the prevalence of emancipative values in a society might
reflect its degree of exchange with the international environment. Hence, we use indicators
of the societies’ economic, social and political exchange, plus a summary indicator labeled
global exchange index. The data were collected by Dreher et al. (2008), as documented in
OA 7 (p. 17).
Culture zone theories suggest that societies do not indifferently pick up anything from
their international environment but are more receptive of trends in societies which they
perceive as alike based on cultural similarities (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Hence, a
society’s level of emancipative values might reflect the level of these values in societies
belonging to the same culture zone. To test this idea we create a cultural diffusion index
that assigns each society the average level of emancipative values of all other societies of
the same culture zone, based on the culture zone classification by Welzel (2013: 23–24)
(see OA 8: 18).
In examining the cohort pattern of value change, we go back to living conditions several
decades ago when older cohorts were in their formative years. Since this temporal
extension limits data availability, we focus on the two most distinctive types of permissive
conditions, one of an existential and the other of an institutional nature: life opportunities
and civic entitlements. Because of data restrictions, we rely on proxy measures of these
variables, using Vanhanen’s (2003) combined literacy and urbanization estimates as a
proxy for life opportunities and his index of democratization as a proxy for civic entitle-
ments. OA 13–14 (pp. 24–25) provide a validation of these proxies.
To examine our theory’s micro-foundation, we introduce additional predictors of
emancipative values at the individual level. These include a summary measure of the other
three components of emancipative values (Welzel 2013: 57–104; OA 2: 7–9). The reason is
obvious: since emancipative values in the field of sexual freedoms are supposed to grow on
the basis of emancipative values in other fields, these other emancipative values should be
a significant predictor of emancipative values in the field of sexual freedoms. The same
should hold true for individual-level characteristics indicating a person’s opportunity
endowments in an objective sense. A decent indicator of a person’s opportunity endow-
ments is her level of education, which is measured on a nine-point index from incomplete
primary-level to complete tertiary-level education. As routine demographic controls, we
include biological sex and a respondent’s year of birth. These variables are documented in
OA 18 (p. 32), with descriptive statistics shown in OA 22 (p. 39).
3.3 Methods
We explain variation in emancipative values on four different bases of evidence. First, we
explain contemporary differences in these values between societies, using our cross-sec-
tional sample of eighty-four to ninety-three societies. In this analytical step, treatment
variables are taken from the same year as the surveys used to measure emancipative values.
We take the latest available measure for each society, which spans a period from 2000 to
2008.
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Second, we explain the amount and direction of change in emancipative values among
the fifty societies of our longitudinal sample, based on simultaneous change in those
treatment variables that were significant in the cross-sectional analyses.
Third, we explain cohort differences in emancipative values within and between soci-
eties by the living conditions that our 510 country-cohorts experienced during the decade
in which they were growing up, using temporally ordered panel regressions.
Fourth, we apply multilevel models to examine how individual and societal charac-
teristics simultaneously shape the emancipative values of some 130,000 respondents from
eighty-nine societies. Specifically, we demonstrate that opportunities which people have in
common with most others in their society strengthen their emancipative values more
pronouncedly than do opportunities which people have on top of what most others have.
4 Evidence
4.1 Cross-Sectional Evidence
We expect that permissive conditions in their various manifestations explain fairly well
how prevalent emancipative values are in given societies. Indeed, the correlations in
Appendix-Table 4 (OA 11: 22) show that each of the twenty-eight indications of per-
missive societal conditions correlates positively and significantly with the prevalence of
emancipative values. Apart from cultural diffusion, three manifestations of permissive
conditions show a particularly strong link with emancipative values: life opportunities,
civic entitlements and secular values.
Figure 2 visualizes these correlations and shows a similar grouping pattern throughout
all three manifestations of permissive conditions: societies in Sub-Saharan Africa, South
Asia and the Middle East beset the lower left-end of the distribution; Western societies led
by Scandinavia are at the upper right end; societies from Latin America and the ex-
communist world are found in between; societies from East Asia scatter over the entire
space, with representatives at both the lower-left (e.g., Vietnam) and the upper-right end
(e.g., Japan).
This pattern is familiar from countless studies of social development and few scholars
would be surprised to rediscover it with whatever objective social indicator one uses
(Delhey and Newton 2005; Estes 2010). However, we rediscover the same pattern with
subjective indicators taken from mass survey data. This is noteworthy given the widespread
suspicion that survey measures are not as reliable as objective social indicators (e.g.,
Stegmueller 2011). Disconfirming this suspicion, the strong link of emancipative values to
life opportunities and civic entitlements reveals that aggregations of subjective values
closely reflect objective societal conditions. In that very sense, these measures are real,
providing powerful evidence that moral systems are in close touch with objective realities.
Looking at the relationship between secular values and emancipative values in the right-
hand diagram of Fig. 2, China and Vietnam are outliers: they combine strong secular
values with weak emancipative values. Other societies in East Asia—including Hong
Kong, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan—also show weaker emancipative values than their
strong secular values suggest. Arguably, this pattern reflects the role of Confucianism in
East Asia. In history, religion was not a formative force of Confucian culture. Thus,
religiosity is not the chief preservative of traditional reproduction norms in this particular
culture. For this reason, strong secular values in East Asia are—in contrast to everywhere
else—not an indicator of an emancipatory culture.
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Permissive societal conditions are collinear across the different domains in which they
materialize. This defies a ‘‘kitchen sink’’ approach that includes many conceptually related
predictors at once in a multivariate regression to explain emancipative values. Instead, we
select from each domain of permissive conditions only one indicator, namely that with the
strongest link to emancipative values. Thus, we select life opportunities from the
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existential domain, civic entitlements from the institutional domain, secular values from
the moral domain, and cultural diffusion from the domain of outside influences. In so
doing, we combine breadth with parsimony, covering a broad range of distinct domains
while selecting only the strongest indicator from each.
Table 1 shows the results of regressions that explain the prevalence of emancipative
values by the selected indicators of permissive societal conditions. In the first model, life
opportunities, civic entitlements and cultural diffusion all show an independent and sig-
nificantly positive effect on emancipative values. Among these three conditions, cultural
diffusion associates with a steeper increase in emancipative values than do life opportu-
nities. But the larger T-ratio of the coefficient for life opportunities indicates that their
explanatory power over emancipative values is larger than that of cultural diffusion.
Global exchange, by contrast, shows no effect under control of the other variables and is
replaced with secular values in model two. Doing so increases the explained variance from
seventy-two to seventy-seven percent. It now turns out that secular values associate with
the steepest gain in emancipative values while life opportunities turn insignificant. Thus,
secular values mediate the effect of life opportunities: these opportunities contribute to
emancipative values only insofar as they give rise to secular values. Still, our sample
includes the distinct group of East Asian societies in which secular values are—in contrast
to everywhere else—not indicative of an emancipatory culture. Ignoring the East Asian
irregularity partly obscures the effect of secular values. By contrast, when we include an
East Asia dummy12 to control for this irregularity, the effect of secular values surfaces
more strongly. This is evident from model 3.13
Table 1 Cross-sectional explanation of societal-level emancipative values with regard to sexual freedoms
Predictors (at time of latest survey) Dependent variable: emancipative values with regard to sexual
freedoms (latest survey, 2000–2008)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant -.00 (-.30) -.00 (-1.70) .01 (.47)
Life opportunities (sq.) .21 (2.98)*** .05 (.65)
Civic entitlements .15 (2.65)*** .23 (4.66)*** .25 (8.04)***
Cultural diffusion .31 (2.41)*** .20 (1.63)
Global exchange .11 (.96)
Secular values .34 (4.26)*** .57 (9.81)***
East Asia (dummy) -.17 (-5.05)***
Adjusted R2 .72 .77 .82
N (societies) 81 81 84
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their T values in parentheses. Test statistics of
heteroskedasticity (White-test) and multicollinearity (variance inflation factors) reveal no violation of OLS
assumptions. However, the DFFITs identify China as an influential case (outlier). Removing it, increases the
explained variance by 2 to 3 percent in Models 1 and 2 and elevates the T value of Secular Values above that
of Civic Entitlements
Significance levels: * p\ .100; ** p\ .050; *** p\ .005;  not significant (p[ .100)
12 China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam are coded 1. All other societies
are coded 0.
13 For a conceptual discussion and empirical treatment of endogeneity, see the Response Section in OA 23
(p. 40).
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Establishing purely cross-sectional associations is insufficient for a causal interpreta-
tion. Causality involves a dynamic relationship in which change in an outcome variable
associates with change in its presumed treatment. This leads us to our second key finding:
societies that made bigger progress towards permissive conditions also experienced larger
gains in emancipative values (Fig. 3).
4.2 Dynamic Evidence
We focus on the fifty societies for which we can measure change over ten or more years.
On this basis, Appendix-Table 5 (OA 12: 23) correlates change in emancipative values
with change in those permissive conditions that turned out as the strongest cross-sectional
correlates in Table 1.
The longitudinal evidence is more selective than the cross-sectional one: fewer variables
correlate with emancipative values in a dynamic way. Indeed, only secular values, life
opportunities and cultural diffusion retain in the dynamic perspective the positive association
with emancipative values. Civic entitlements, by contrast, do not correlate with emancipative
values in a dynamic way. Hence, the association of civic entitlements with these values in the
cross-section lacks a dynamic underpinning. It cannot be causal for this reason.
The analyses in Table 2 re-examine the bivariate results from Appendix-Table 3 in a
multivariate framework, using dynamic regressions. We regress emancipative values at the
time of the latest survey T2 on (1) themselves at the time of the earliest survey T1 and (2)
on change from T1 to T2 in the treatment variables. This model is dynamic because, under
control of the lagged dependent variable, we see for other predictors in the model how
much they shift emancipative values at T2 upward or downward from where they were at
T1. The other reason why the model is dynamic is that the predictors themselves measure
change. Hence, the regression models show to what extent change from T1 to T2 in a given
treatment shifts emancipative values at T2 upward or downward from their level at T1.
Including the lagged dependent variable among the predictors has some more desirable
properties. For one, we reduce the problem of endogeneity: should other predictors in the
model be endogenous to emancipative values, the lagged level of emancipative values
absorbs this endogeneity. Next, we reduce omitted variable bias: lagged emancipative
values embody virtually every prior influence on these values, including influences we are
unaware of (Pascarella and Wolniak 2004).14
Under these premises, the two models in Table 2 show that emancipative values are
self-perpetuating over time. This is evident from the strong influence of lagged emanci-
pative values. Beyond that, an increase from T1 to T2 in life opportunities by one unit shifts
emancipative values at T2 upward from its level at T1 by a .28-unit. A one-unit increase in
the mean level of emancipative values in other societies of the same culture zone elevates
these values by another .27-unit. Expanding civic entitlements show no effect on rising
emancipative values, confirming the lack of a dynamic association in Appendix-Table 3.
If we replace change in life opportunities with change in secular values (model 2), the
explained variance increases from sixty to sixty-nine percent. Expanding civic entitlements
remain insignificant and cultural diffusion drops in significance. Changing secular values is
now by far the strongest predictor: a one-unit rise in secular values yields a .58-unit rise in
emancipative values. Interestingly, while the East Asia dummy was significant in the cross-
section, it no longer is in the dynamic perspective. Thus, East Asian traditions are linked
14 Against criticism by Achen (2001), Keele and Kelly (2006) defend the use of lagged dependent variables
as appropriate for most cases of application.
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with a low level of emancipative values, but they do not hamper the rise of emancipative
values from that low level.
These findings suggest that the rise of emancipative values is not induced by
improvements in institutional conditions but in existential conditions. And this process is
mediated by secular values: ascending life opportunities give rise to emancipative values
mostly because this ascension strengthens secular values.
Figures 3 and 4 visualize the sequential dynamic. Figure 3 illustrates the effect of
ascending life opportunities on rising secular values; Fig. 4 illustrates the effect of rising
secular values on rising emancipative values. In both figures, the left-hand diagram shows
the uncontrolled effect, while the right-hand diagram shows the effect under controls.
The left-hand diagram of Fig. 3 shows that societies with the lowest ascension of life
opportunities—namely post-Soviet societies such as Russia, Belarus and Ukraine—expe-
rienced a decrease in secular values. Conversely, societies with some of the highest
ascensions of life opportunities—including Spain, Ireland and Norway—also experienced
the largest increases in secular values.
China is a pronounced outlier from this logic, together with Japan: in both cases, change
towards secular values is considerably lower than the ascension of life opportunities suggests.
Partly, these two societies’ deviation from the close relationship between ascending life
opportunities and rising secular values is explained by the fact that they both started from an
unusually high level of secular values: they couldn’t get much more secular, even with
massively improving living opportunities. Thus, when we control for the start-level of
Table 2 Dynamic models explaining the shift in emancipative values from the earliest to latest survey with
change in predictor variables
Predictors Dependent variable: Emancipative values at T2
Model 1 Model 2
Constant -.02 (.28) .05 (.94)
Emancipative values at T1 .85 (4.71)*** .84 (5.25)***
D (T2 - T1) Life opportunities (sq.) .28 (2.37)**
D (T2 - T1) Civic entitlements -.01 (-.14)
 .04 (.75)
D (T2 - T1) Cultural diffusion .27 (2.20)** .18 (1.82)*
D (T2 - T1) Secular values .58 (4.19)***
East Asia (dummy) -.03 (-.63)
Adjusted R2 .60 .69
N (societies) 47 49
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their T values in parentheses. Test statistics of
heteroskedasticity (White-test) and multicollinearity (variance inflation factors) reveal no violation of OLS
assumptions. Influential case diagnostics (DFFITs) identify China as a leverage case. Excluding China, the
coefficient for change in Secular Values drops somewhat (b = .58) and so does the T value (3.71) but it
remains the most significant and strongest effect
Significance levels: * p\ .100; ** p\ .050; *** p\ .005;  not significant (p[ .100)
T2: Time of latest survey if at least 10 years after first survey (15 surveys from WVS round 4 with modal
year 2000 and 37 surveys from round 5 with modal survey year 2006; mean year of T2 is 2004)
T1: Time of earliest survey if at least 10 years before last survey (23 surveys from WVS round 1 with modal
survey year 1982, 22 surveys from round 2 with modal survey year 1990 and 7 surveys from round 3 with
modal survey year 1996; mean year of T1 is 1987)
D (T2 - T1): Minimum time distance is 10 years, maximum is 27 years, mean time distance is 17 years
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secularism (see right-hand diagram of Fig. 3), China and Japan move closer to the regression
line and the explained variance improves from thirty-six to forty-four percent.
In Fig. 4, China appears as a leverage case at the opposite end of Spain. Thus, these two
societies provide a particularly illustrative contrast as concerns the dependence of rising
emancipative values on parallel gains in secular values. Again, the post-Soviet societies are
illustrative too: with the resurgence of religiosity after a failed secular doctrine, secular
values declined, which apparently prevented the rise of emancipative values.
4.3 Cohort-Related Evidence
Our third key finding is that cohorts whose members grew up at times with more per-
missive conditions exhibit stronger emancipative values today than members of cohorts
whose upbringing was characterized by more restrictive conditions.
To demonstrate this point, the left-hand diagram of Fig. 5 plots the level of emanci-
pative values for the members of eight successive cohorts, separately for Welzel’s (2013:
23) ten global culture zones (see OA 2, Appendix-Table 2, p. 5). There is an obvious
tendency that emancipative values increase along the cohort succession in each culture
zone. But the level of the tendency differs between culture zones, and so does its gradient.
The level is lowest and the gradient flattest in the Islamic East, Sub-Saharan Africa and the
Indic East—the zones with the most constrained life opportunities. Conversely, the level of
the cohort trend is highest and the gradient steepest in the Western world—the part of the
globe with the most abundant life opportunities. Ex-communist societies, Latin America
and the Sinic East sit in between—as they are in terms of life opportunities.
The cohort pattern could reflect a lifecycle effect: younger people are always more
emancipatory but become less so as they age. The right-hand diagram of Fig. 5, however,
disconfirms a lifecycle effect. It shows how the level of emancipative values changed in
each cohort among the dozen societies for which we have longitudinal evidence from the
first to the fifth wave of the WVS, covering almost 30 years. Obviously, birth cohorts did
not become less emancipatory as they aged. On the contrary, they became more eman-
cipatory. Yet, they did become more emancipatory in ways that reproduce the cohort
differences from almost 30 years before. Thus, even though the time trend strengthens
emancipative values, the fact that it elevates each cohort from its specific start-level
reproduces cohort differences over time.
Figure 6 shows two scatterplots obtained from regressing the country-cohorts’ eman-
cipative values today on life opportunities and civic entitlements prevalent in the given
country at the time of the respective cohort’s upbringing.15 The evidence is clear: cohort
members exhibit stronger emancipative values today, the more permissive the conditions
of their country were at the time of their upbringing. However, among the two permissive
conditions, life opportunities are more important than civic entitlements: the former
explains thirty-two percent, the latter only seven percent of the country-cohorts’ emanci-
pative values (in total, we explain sixty-eight percent, so the remainder of twenty-nine
percent is due to inseparable overlap between life opportunities and civic entitlements).16
15 OA 17 (p. 28) documents the regression results.
16 The explanatory power of life opportunities over emancipative values is as strong for the cohort dif-
ferences within the same countries (i.e., 64 % explained variance) as it is for the country differences within
the same cohorts (58 %). Also, the spatial relatedness of different cohort observations from the same
countries and the temporal relatedness of different country observations from the same cohorts apply to both
emancipative values and its predictor variables. Spatial and temporal correlation is, thus, the same on both
sides of the equation, which assures comparability.
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The impact of life opportunities remains significant when we clean it from endogeneity
to emancipative values. To do so we isolate the part of life opportunities that is unex-
plained by the emancipative values of the cohorts grown up before these opportunities.
These ‘‘endogeneity-clean’’ life opportunities retain a significant and positive effect on the
emancipative values of the cohorts grown-up under these opportunities. By contrast,
‘‘endogeneity-clean’’ civic entitlements entirely loose significance: de-coupled from the
emancipative values of the cohorts grown-up before these entitlements, they show no more
influence on the emancipative values of the cohorts grown-up under these entitlements.
These findings suggest that the emancipatory effect of formative life opportunities is real,
while that of formative civic entitlements is not.
There is again evidence for the role of secular values as a mediator between life
opportunities and emancipative values: (1) life opportunities during the decade of a
cohort’s upbringing explain thirty-eight percent of this cohort’s secular values today17; (2)
secular values during the decade of a cohort’s upbringing explain thirty percent of this
cohort’s emancipative values today.18 In other words, while preceding life opportunities
explain subsequent secular values, preceding secular values explain subsequent emanci-
pative values. We find no effects in the opposite direction of impact. These regression
results are documented in OA 17 (p. 31).
4.4 Multilevel Evidence
This section evidences the micro-foundation of our findings. As we will see, individuals
who experience richer opportunities tend to be more emancipatory in their orientation.
However, opportunity endowments strengthen people’s emancipative values more by the
social sharedness of these endowments than by their individual uniqueness.
The multilevel regressions in Table 3 demonstrate these points. The societal-level
component of the three models confirms the results of the cross-sectional regressions in
Table 1. The novel part are the individual-level effects, all of which point in the expected
direction: emancipative values in fields other than sexuality, together with secular values,
show the strongest effects on support for sexual freedoms. However, characteristics of the
society in which a person lives strengthen this person’s emancipative values more than her
own characteristics.19 For instance, a one-unit increase in a person’s own secular values
strengthens this person’s emancipative values by a .18-unit, but the same increase in the
social prevalence of secular values strengthens this person’s emancipative values by a .46-
unit. In short, the part of one’s secularism that one has in common with most others in
one’s society strengthens one’s emancipative values more than the part that exceeds the
secularism of most others.
Moreover, shared secular values enhance the emancipatory effect of education. This is
evident from Fig. 7 and the cross-level interactions in Table 3: an individual’s education
17 The effect exists controlling for civic entitlements during the decade of a cohort’s upbringing, which
explain only an insignificant one percent of this cohort’s secular values today.
18 The effect exists controlling for life opportunities during the cohort’s upbringing, which explain twelve
percent of this cohort’s emancipative values today.
19 This conclusion is safe because all individual-level variables are centered on their societal mean level.
This filters out from the individual-level measures all overlapping variance with similar societal-level
measures. Thus, we perfectly separate individual-level and societal-level effects.
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Table 3 Multi-level models explaining individual respondents’ emancipative values
Predictors (at time of latest survey) Dependent variable: emancipative values with regard to sexual
freedoms (latest survey, 2000–2008)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant .32 (32.19)*** .33 (39.52)*** .32 (38.75)***
Societal-level effects (SL)
Civic entitlements .17 (3.20)*** .19 (5.21)*** .22 (6.89)***
Life opportunities (sq.) .34 (5.66)*** .09 (1.71)*
Secular values .46 (5.50)*** .52 (7.45)***
East Asia (dummy) -.09 (-2.95)** -.15 (-4.31)*** -.14 (-4.02)***
Individual-level effects (IL)
Female sex .02 (8.42)*** .02 (9.76)*** .02 (9.74)***
Birth year .13 (9.79)*** .13 (9.86)*** .13 (9.83)***
Formal education .09 (13.68)*** .09 (13.83)*** .09 (13.89)***
Other emancipative values .18 (11.66)*** .18 (11.67)*** .18 (11.67)***
Secular values .18 (15.23)*** .18 (15.24)*** .18 (15.24)***
Cross-level interactions
Female (IL) 9 Entitlements (SL) .01 (.89) .02 (1.53) .02 (1.98)*
Female (IL) 9 opportunities (SL) .06 (4.60)*** .00 (.24)
Female (IL) 9 secular values (SL) .11 (5.82)*** .11 (7.38)***
Female (IL) 9 East Asia (SL) -.01 (-.95) -.02 (-2.61)** -.02 (-2.56)**
Birth year (IL) 9 entitlements (SL) .18 (2.92)** .19 (2.99)*** .18 (3.78)***
Birth year (IL) 9 Opportunities (SL) .02 (.22) -.03 (-.23)
Birth year (IL) 9 secular Values (SL) .08 (.72) .06 (.80)
Birth Year (IL) 9 East Asia (SL) -.00 (-.10) -.02 (-.33) -.02 (-.36)
Education (IL) 9 entitlements (SL) .11 (3.40)*** .12 (3.78)*** .12 (4.93)***
Education (IL) 9 opportunities (SL) .08 (1.90)* -.01 (.22)
Education (IL) 9 secular values (SL) .12 (2.08)** .13 (3.02)***
Education (IL) 9 East Asia (SL) -.00 (.04) -.02 (-.78) -.02 (-.77)
Error reduction (%)
IL-variation of DV 13.0 % 13.0 % 13.0 %
SL-variation of DV 73.1 % 82.0 % 81.6 %
Female’s IL-effect 42.5 % 60.0 % 60.0 %
Birth year’s IL-effect 24.3 % 23.7 % 25.1 %
Education’s IL-effect 48.2 % 48.5 % 49.2 %
N (observations) 132,099 individuals in 89 societies
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with T-ratios in parentheses (based on robust standard
errors). Models calculated with HLM 6.02. Samples weighted to equal size, using the latest survey from
each society (2000–2008). Reduction of error calculated from change in random variance component
relative to the empty model. All individual-level variables (except female sex) are country-mean centered;
societal-level variables (except East Asia dummy) are global-mean centered. 64 % of the variation in
emancipative values is at the individual level, 36 % at the societal level (i.e., intra-class correlation: .60)
Significance levels: * p\ .050; ** p\ .010; *** p\ .001;  not significant (p[ .050)
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strengthens her emancipative values more pronouncedly when this education takes place in
a more secular society.20
5 Discussion
Emancipative values in the domain of sexuality vary greatly across societies around the
globe. Contrary to the notion that culture is a constant, these values have been changing
considerably, showing sizeable increases in the overwhelming majority of societies, albeit
within differing ranges of growth. Levels as well as changes in emancipative values co-
vary strongly—and meaningfully—with objective social indicators, especially those
measuring life opportunity endowments on a mass scale. In general, emancipative values
are more prevalent where life opportunities are more abundant for large population seg-
ments. Correspondingly, emancipative values have grown most rapidly where life
opportunities have been ascending on the steepest slope.
However, in the domain of sexuality the emancipatory effect of ascending life oppor-
tunities is indirect: abundant life opportunities favor emancipative values in sexual matters
only in as far as their ascension diminishes the appeal of religion and, hence, gives rise to
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Fig. 7 Variation in education’s individual-level effect on emancipative values as a function of secular
values at the societal level
20 There are more cross-level interactions to report but these are beyond the focus of this article, so we
refrain from stating them here. Let us just briefly mention that the emancipatory effect of being female
greatly enhances when secular values are more widespread in a society.
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secular values. In the process of sexual emancipation, secularization is a necessary inter-
mediary step because religion is the most powerful preservative of traditional sex norms.
Our global, cross-cultural evidence shows that people’s subjective values are in touch
with objective utilities. This reality link allows moral systems to evolve ‘‘naturally’’ in
response to shifts in objective utilities. If these shifts move upward the freedom ladder,
emancipative values rise. From an evolutionary point of view, emancipative values are a
true moral innovation because their rise breaks a perennial limitation of human morality:
the age-old consensus over traditional sex norms. In a humanitarian sense, sexual eman-
cipation might even be characterized as ethical ‘‘progress,’’ for emancipative values
associate with more trust in strangers, stronger civic activism, wider circles of solidarity
and less tolerance of discrimination and human casualties (Deutsch and Welzel 2011;
Inglehart et al. 2015; Welzel and Delhey 2015).
Unfortunately, we have no direct observation of the process generating value change
between two measurements in time. Here we face a black box that we cannot unpack in the
absence of panel data. And in the absence of experimental control, the causal status of our
findings inevitably retains a speculative element. The best we can do to lend further
credibility to our insights is to continue the time series and produce a richer longitudinal
database for additional examinations. The WVS remains the most important tool for this
purpose. Its continuation and extension into uncovered areas needs to rank high on the
research agenda of value change.
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